Relapse rates and thus the impact of therapies have been decreasing. Why they decline and the impact on our ability to understand which treatments are better require more than simple math. The objective of this review is to discuss the impact of regression to the mean, changes in outcome effects and how we compare outcomes over time and among studies. This paper provides discourse on the topics of regression to the mean, some examples of the pitfalls of changes and some difficulties in the interpretation of the common percentage change in outcomes. The results show that we can often be deceived by what we think we see and they also demonstrate how such confusion evolves in the literature. This article aims to caution against the over-interpretation of changes from baseline, which are helped along by regression towards the mean and other factors. Furthermore, how we interpret changes from baseline requires care and not wishful thinking, coupled with careful digestion of seemingly reasonable explications of results.
John Snow has historically been credited with stopping the spread of cholera in London. 1 The story goes that, after analyzing the water sources of several districts, Snow concluded the source of the water supplying the Broad Street pump was contaminated and he stopped the epidemic by removing its water pump handle, thus preventing the spread of disease! However, as appealing as this epidemiological story has become, Smith 2 has pointed out that the epidemic had long subsided by the time Snow removed the Broad Street pump handle. However, Snow wasn't wrong about the source of the infection. Those who attributed the success to the removal of the pump handle were ignorant of epidemic theory, which predicts that the number of cases diminishes as the pool of uninfected individuals diminishes.
But if epidemic theory says cases will decline on their own, does this same theory tell us something about clinical trials and specifically about MS? Are there other observations that lead us astray? Many questions remain about the course and treatment of MS. Why are relapse rates dropping? They have been shown to decline in clinical trials over the past 20 years, but they also seem to drop over the course of trials, even in the placebo arms.
Several authors have published and discussed the decline in annualized relapse rates (ARR). 3, 4 The decline appears to be real. Some posit the result of increased rigor in the definition of a relapse, the changes in the selection of patients thought to benefit from being in a trial or the insertion of rescue therapy and/or re-consenting of patients following a relapse, and still others suggest potential changes in the populations under study due to changes in MS disease definition. Could it be explained by the fact that we try to enrich the population by requiring a recent history of relapses and/or active MRI-enhancing lesions? If these selection criteria are in play, the results would be subject to regression towards the mean. This powerful inducer of changes in outcomes is often ignored, and this will be discussed in more detail below.
We can all agree that annualized relapse rates in trials are falling, even if we cannot agree why this is happening. This leaves two important questions: is the change in ARR only occurring in clinical trials and what does this mean for comparing trials over time?
The comparison of trials has shown or suggested that most of the explanations have merit, but could regression toward the mean explain such a result? Perhaps the first big question to answer is: what is regression towards the mean? Many authors have commented on regression toward the mean. The statistical term "regression" was coined by Galton in 1886 5 in his paper "Regression towards Mediocracy in Hereditary Stature", where he reported that children of short parents were short, but taller than the average of their parents' stature and closer to the mean of the population; and similarly, children of tall parents were tall, but not to the extremes of their parents, and again closer to the mean of the population. Galton called this "regression towards mediocrity". This phenomenon happens whenever variables are measured with error and selection on that variable is used to identify the cohort being studied. The group selected is thus higher (or lower) than the mean of the usual population, but since some of those selected are merely high (or low) due to measurement error, the mean of the group measured after selection is closer to the mean of the population, and when change is measured, it is often interpreted as an effect of therapy. This can be called a placebo effect, but in fact, it is merely a consequence of selection. This has been well known for decades in blood pressure studies and other clinical measures. It will occur whenever the correlation between two assessments of the same variable is less than unity, and selection is based on one of them. Regression to the mean can lead to misinterpretations of the data, if ignored.
The most common misconception is that those coming into a study with the highest or most extreme values are the ones who benefit the most. When one addresses this question by dividing the results by baseline levels to assess the treatment effects, we actually expect to observe greater treatment effects the further the cutpoint is from the mean. This common finding is due to regression toward the mean. Thus, what may seem like an obvious clinical result is by itself not evidence that the therapy helps those who need it most, but a mirage induced by regression toward the mean. The change from baseline will, on average, be greater for the more extreme groups. This can be visualized more easily by considering worsening of disease as measured by relapses. Consider the screening of MS patients by asking them how many relapses they had in the 12 months prior to screening. There will be those who say zero, one and let's say two or more. Those who answer zero are made up of two groups: those who have not had any relapses in the past year and those who either didn't recognize them or misstated the occurrence in not remembering that it was within the past 12 months. These individuals will not show a treatment benefit. Indeed, their annualized relapse rate will not be zero! They will appear to show some relapses and thus worsen on treatment. This is often discounted and understood, but it is an example of regression toward the mean. So when we think about those who come into a study with a history of two or more relapses and appear to show a treatment benefit, part of this is also regression toward the mean. Of course, this is why we have placebo groups and/ or comparison groups since both groups are subject to this statistical artifact, but it does impact the measures of treatment response.
Consider the common finding that reductions in the sustained progression are almost always less than the impact on relapses. Is this the disease or could it be regression to the mean? Any subject measured randomly low by one or points on the Expanded Disability Status Scale (EDSS) step would qualify as having undergone sustained progression if, on subsequent examinations, she is measured correctly by one or more points. This is "regressing upward"; it occurs in both groups but impacts the proportion of progressions identified. What proportion of sustained change is due to this is unknown, but it certainly exists.
Increasingly potent and targeted treatments favor lowering the relapse rate in the active treatment arms, but the quantification of the improvements needs careful thought. Many newer drugs do use active comparators, and the increased benefit seen by these drugs is probably real. However, uncertain assumptions of the definition, selection and populations examined make comparisons of ARRs and, indeed, percentage reductions across trials even more problematic. This is nicely recognized in a recent article by Klawiter et al. 6 The simple mathematics of the percentage reduction should inform us that a percentage reduction that is larger or smaller between two studies is not the same as differences measured in the absolute differences. Both may be important, but they tell us different things.
Assume we conduct two trials, with the same numbers of patients in two-year trials. In the first trial, the ARR in the placebo (comparator) arm is 0.50 and the ARR in the active arm is 0.30. The absolute difference is 0.50-0.30 = 0.20. The proportionate reduction in ARR is 1-(0.30/0.50) = 1 -0.60 = 0.40, or a percentage reduction of 40%! In the second trial, the ARR in the comparator arm is 0.35 and in the active arm is 0.15. The absolute difference is 0.35-0.15 = 0.20, the same as above. However, the proportionate reduction is 1 -(0.15/0.35) = 1 -0.43 = 0.57, or a 57% reduction compared to the 40% reduction in our first trial.
Comparing these trials initiated at different times might lead to the potentially erroneous conclusion that, in a more recently conducted trial, the same reduction in absolute numbers of events produces a better drug. Is the drug better because the percentage reduction is better or is this drug equivalent to the previous results because the same number of relapses have been spared?
Payors often do not use the percentage reduction, but rather the absolute event rate difference. They often think in terms of proportions: what proportion of patients will have an event within a year? This figure is very meaningful to payors since it represents the number of patients for whom a payout is needed. To assess this, we use the proportion of patients who, within a year, have at least one relapse. Here, the proportions in each treatment group are calculated and the difference between the two proportions can be used to identify the numbers who need to be treated to prevent or to save the cost of one relapse. Suppose 35% of the comparison group and 20% of the new treatment group experiences at least one relapse. The absolute difference in the proportions is 0.15 (0.35-0.20=0.15). The 0.15 difference in the proportions with a relapse can be converted to the number of patients who need to be treated to save one relapse using the new treatment compared to the control treatment. This is a natural concept from a cost perspective. It is computed as the number needed to be treated (NNT) = 1/(difference in rates) and thus = 1/0.15 = 6.67. Thus, seven patients must be treated for one year to prevent one relapse.
NNT is the same, irrespective of the proportion with relapses: 0.20 versus 0.35 (a relative reduction of 43%) or 0.10 versus 0.25 (a relative reduction of 60%). From the economic cost perspective, the cost of utilizing a therapy is the same: the cost of preventing one relapse requires treating seven people for one year. A decade ago, drugs were only capable of reducing relapses by 33%. How does that compare economically with the drugs of today?
If the ARR in the treatment group compared to the control group were 0.67 and 1.00, respectively, this would represent a 33% reduction and absolute risk reduction of 0.33. Today, the placebo groups are achieving rates of 0.30 to 0.40. If the active agents reduce this by 50%, that would mean an ARR of 0.20 compared to the placebo of 0.40. The percentage reduction is 50%, but the absolute risk reduction is 0.20. The NNT in the decade-old study is 1/0.33 = 3, compared to the NNT of the newer agent of 1/0.20 = 5.
Thus, while the percentage reduction is greater for the "modern" drug, the number of patients who need to be treated is five compared to the older data of three, a 67% increase in cost to save one additional relapse. Though it should be obvious why this is important, it is even more important to ask whether the relapse rates in trials of disease-modifying agents that have been dropping since the 1990s do, in fact, represent the MS population.
Our perception is that the newer drugs with greater percentage reductions in relapse rates show superiority over existing agents, but our questions about costs and the added associated risks may not be simply answered by comparing across trials. Thus, while trials are seen as the pinnacle of evidence, observational data and trends over time in wellcharacterized cohorts may be needed to provide intelligent answers to policy decisions about treatments to track trends that may occur solely within trials. Comparisons across trials over time are laced with dangers. This may be a topic of another article, but such comparisons should not be made without taking great care to account for the issues raised above.
Sometimes indirect comparisons are made with information from a trial. If treatment A reduces the ARR significantly from 0.50 at baseline to 0.25 over the study (p=0.041), a change of 0.25 (standard deviation=0.704, n=100) in Drug A and the placebo group reduces the ARR from 0.51 to 0.30 (p=0.082), a change of 0.19 from baseline (sd=1.40,n=100) and not a statistically significantly difference. Should one conclude that Drug A is superior to the placebo? The answer is no! This comparison is not valid! The question is whether there a significant difference in the reductions in relapse rates between the two treatments? The approach above shows that a significant reduction has occurred with treatment A and the post treatment ARR is significantly lower than the baseline. There is statistical evidence that the null hypothesis that the change is zero is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that it is lower. Similarly, the data do not support rejecting the null hypothesis that the placebo's ARR is significantly changed. However, this within-group comparison asking if change has occurred does not directly compare the changes in ARR over time between the two groups. For this comparison, we must compare the changes between the two groups. If we were to perform a t-test comparing the treatments, then: Thus, there is insufficient evidence to suggest a treatment difference in lowering the ARR. It would be inappropriate to declare Treatment A superior to Treatment B. The logic of this is that one can see that both groups had a reduction from baseline: Group A, a 0.25 reduction and Group B, a 0.19 reduction. However, 0.25 is not materially more than 0.19 with this sample size, despite the fact that we can with some level of confidence say that 0.25 is bigger than zero, but 0.19 is not sufficiently so.
In summary, this article aims to caution against the overinterpretation of changes from baseline, which are helped along by regression towards the mean and other factors. Furthermore, how we interpret changes from baseline requires care and not wishful thinking and careful digestion of seemingly reasonable explications of results. And finally, while John Snow's methodological rigor has led to him being called the father of modern epidemiology-despite the over interpretation of removing the broad street pumpone can't help but wonder who might be getting credit in
